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Abstract 
Internet of Things is future trend that assure to enhance and upgrades our everyday living by utilizing intelligent objects and
sensors collectively. These devices are supposed to make use of constrained application protocol (CoAP) to communicate at 
application layer. Communication security is mainstay of constrained environments. Confidential communication within 
constrained devices will be carried out by secure CoAP (CoAPs) which makes use of DTLS protocol. To cope with constrained 
devices we use integration of CoAP and DTLS compressed by following 6LoWPAN standards. Compressed DTLS minimizes 
packet size and possibly avoids fragmentation. In addition to this we used the raw public key concept over DTLS to authenticate
the multivendor constrained devices. Evaluation results shows that CoAPs with Raw Public Key provides communication 
security and authentication portability in multivendor environment at minimal energy consumption. CoAPs with Raw Public Key 
improves the interoperability as well as lifetime of network. 
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1. Introduction 
The IETF standardize IPV6 over Low-power Wireless Personal Area Network (6LoWPAN) to provide routing in 
low power and lossy wireless sensor networks. In IoT smart devices are interconnected through such IPV6 protocol. 
Due to congestion control algorithm and low power and lossy links TCP performance proves to be inefficient in 
wireless sensor networks. Thus preferably connectionless UDP is used in IoT. Furthermore HTTP protocol which 
uses TCP as underlying protocol to run, is inefficient in constrained environments. The IETF proposed 
connectionless and compact Constrained Application Protocol as new standard for IoT1. CoAP is especially 
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designed to satisfy the requirement such as low overhead, simplicity and multicast communication support in 
resource constrained environments. 
CoAP proposes to use DTLS as the underlying security protocol for data encryption, authentication, integrity 
protection and for automatic key management2. CoAP with DTLS is called as secure CoAP and abbreviated as 
CoAPs. DTLS requires number of message exchanges to establish secure connection between interacting nodes. 
Though DTLS provides wide range of cryptographic services, it was originally designed for networks in which 
message length was not main criteria. That’s why use of DTLS as it is for constrained devices is inefficient. To 
comply with constrained devices and networks, 6LoWPAN header compression mechanisms are defined. DTLS 
supports partial interoperability for IoT devices in PSK mode in which manufactures have to preshare keys to 
provide secure communication. Obtaining such trust in multivendor environment is difficult. On the other hand 
supporting X.509 based Public Key Infrastructure (PKIX) is challenging in IoT environments. 
In this paper we use the concept of raw public keys with compressed DTLS in CoAP3. This integration provides 
three benefits. First, energy saving by reducing message size. Second, avoids 6LoWPAN fragmentation at link layer 
MTU when size of datagram is larger. Third, reduces the burden of constrained devices from storing and 
transmitting X.509 certificates while doing DTLS handshake. 
2. Literature Survey 
In this section we discuss the approaches that aim to provide end to end security solutions for constrained 
environments. Communication between nodes in 6LoWPAN networks and conventional Internet secured by using 
compressed IPsec4. Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) extension headers and Authentication Header (AH) are 
compressed using Next Header Compression (NHC). Above solution is extended with implementation of IPSec in 
tunnel mode5. Trusted Platform Module provides hardware support for RSA algorithm, used with DTLS in 
6LoWPAN6. As they have used DTLS as it is, this proves to be inefficient because of redundant bits in message.    
Keohet al7 proposed the architecture to provide the secure network access and unicast, multicast key management 
with extended DTLS. Elliptic Curve Cryptography implemented on constrained devices do not consider protocol 
implementation, DTLS, 6LoWPAN shim layer and application code8.
3. Background 
It is difficult for resource constrained devices connect in secure and trustworthy manner, because of 
heterogeneity in IoT networks. In this section we provide brief introduction of technologies used in the design of 
compact CoAPs with raw public key. 
3.1. CoAP 
CoAP is application layer protocol especially designed for constrained devices. CoAP uses UDP to run as 
underlying protocol. CoAP provides REST interface to provide efficient communication among the devices. To 
protect CoAP communication, DTLS has been selected as basic security protocol. CoAP using DTLS security is 
termed as secured CoAP (CoAPs) like the TLS secured HTTP as HTTPs. CoAP uses Universal Resource Identifier 
(URI) to access the resources on destination device. CoAP protocol uses “coap” URI scheme. CoAP securely 
accesses the web resource on destination device as follows: 
coaps://IPV6address:port/Resource_name 
CoAP is simply a request-response type protocol and provides both types of communication viz. reliable and 
unreliable. Devices using the CoAP may act as client, server or both. The reasons that a new protocol is defined for 
constrained IP networks, instead of simply reusing HTTP, is to greatly reduce overhead in implementation 
complexity and to reduce the bandwidth requirements. Such data reduction also helps to increase reliability by 
reducing link layer fragmentation and reduce latency in typical low-power lossy wireless networks, such as IEEE 
802.15.4. 
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3.2. DTLS 
DTLS is complete security protocol that performs key exchange, authentication and securing application data by 
using algorithms and negotiated keying material. DTLS contains the two layers, lower layer and upper layer2. Lower 
layer contains the record protocol and upper layer contains one of the three protocols, Handshake, Alert and 
ChangeCipherSpec or data. The handshake process uses ChangeCipherSpec to indicate record protocol should 
protect subsequent messages by using cipher suite. Alert protocol is used to communicate error message between 
nodes. Record header contains the fragment field and content type. Fragment field contains one of three handshake 
protocol, alert protocol, ChangeCipherSpec protocol or data based on value contained in content type. The record 
header protocol has the responsibility of protecting upper layer protocols. DTLS handshake protocol is chatty and 
contains number of message exchanges in asynchronous manner. The handshake messages are organized in flights 
and used to exchange the information like cipher suites, security keys and compression methods.  
3.3. 6LoWPAN 
The 6LoWPAN standard proposed header compression and fragmentation scheme of IPV6 datagrams for 
6LoWPAN networks9.This standard provides two techniques Next header compression (NHC) and IP header 
compression (IPHC). The IPHC encoding compresses the header length up to 7 bytes in multi hop networks. The 
IPV6 extension header and UDP header are compressed by using NHC. By using 6LoWPAN standard for NHC only 
headers up to UDP can be compressed. Absence of NH bit in NHC for UDP mentions compressed UDP, so new 
NHC technique must be defined. 
3.4. DTLS Compression3
The Record protocol always adds the 13 bytes header to each outgoing packet from the device that uses DTLS 
protocol. Similarly handshake protocol adds 12 bytes of header to each handshake message. 6LoWPAN NHC 
reduces the header lengths of record and handshake up to 5 and 3 bytes respectively3. This is applicable to fresh 
handshake only. 
Fig. 1 shows various 6LoWPAN_NHC encodings for DTLS headers. Fig. 1(a) shows encodings for record and 
handshake headers as LoWPAN_NHC_RHS and LoWPAN_NHC_R as encoding for record only. The Version, 
Epoch, Sequence Number and Fragment can be compressed based on value they hold. EC value can be 0 or 1, that’s 
why most of the times 8 bit EC is used. Two bits of SN in LoWPAN_NHC_R encoding allows 16,24,32 or 48 bit 
sequence number  can be used. If F is 0 then handshake message is not fragmented and the fields fragment length 
and fragment offset are omitted. If 1 then both fields are carried inline. 
Fig. 1(b) represents the encoding for ClientHello message as (LoWPAN_NHC_C). Is SI field is 0, new 
handshake is initiated, then only random fields needs to be transmitted and all other are omitted. The Compression 
method and Ciphersuite have their default values and therefore do not need to be negotiated. The random field in the 
ClientHello is always carried inline whereas the version field is always omitted. Fig. 1(c) represents encoding for 
ServerHello message as LoWPAN_NHC_SH and is similar to ClientHello message. All other handshake messages 
are carried inline. 
(a)                                                     (b)                                                  (c) 
Fig. 1LoWPAN Encoding for different DTLS Headers3.(a) LoWPAN_NHC encoding Record+Handshake Header and Record Header 
Only.(b)LoWPAN_ NHC encoding for Clienthello Message. (c)LoWPAN_NHC encoding for ServerHello message 
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4. Proposed System 
Fig. 2 shows typical network setup for IoT, in which 6LoWPAN network containing CoAPs enabled devices are 
connected through 6LoWPAN Border Router (6LBR) with conventional Internet. As shown in figure header 
compression is applied in the 6LoWPAN network only, between constrained devices and 6LBR. To allow the 
devices in multivendor environment to authenticate each other, the concept of raw public key has been introduced 
instead of X.509 certificates10. The TLS client device is configured with raw public key and also is able to process 
the raw public key accepted from server. Client initiates handshake process by sending Client_Hello message to the 
server.Server Verifies the client and reply Hello_Verify_Req back to client. Client verifies server and sends C_Hello 
to server, also server replies with S_Hello to client. After Key exchange process if server requires client’s 
authentication, server can send CertificateRequest message to client requesting  raw public key from client. Client 
who has raw public key configured, returns it in the Certificate payload to the server.Also server provides raw public 
key in certificate payload back to client. 
Fig. 2Set up of IoT containing constrained devices using coaps with Raw Public Key 
Fig.3CoAPs using Raw Public Key.
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6. Conclusion 
Secure CoAP is the basic need of resource constrained devices in real IoT environment. Datagram Transport 
Layer Security is the standard protocol to empower secure CoAP. New 6LoWPAN header compression schemes 
reduces overhead of DTLS protocol. Also use of Raw Public Key by DTLS provides the authentication portability at 
device level without consuming too much energy. CoAPs using compressed DTLS with raw public key is efficient 
in energy consumption of nodes, memory requirement, network response and authentication interoperability. 
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